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The technology transfer process between a public laboratory and a company has been the subject of many 
publicationsand  has  been  widely  discussed  in  economic  theory.  This  paper  highlights  several  newly 
identified  asymmetries  occurring  between  the  different  agents  taking  part  in  the  process,  dealing 
specifically with the aerospace and defense sectors in France. 
These specificities concern the characteristics, capabilities and competencies (the „capacities‟) of French 
SMEs  and  public  research  laboratories.  The  theoretical  corpus  of  the  article  draws  partly  upon  the 
analyses of „dynamic and interactive capabilities‟ (and competencies), and for the rest upon empirical 
sources, being based on the recent experience of one of the most dynamic Technology Transfer Offices 
(TTOs) in France: the case of ONERA (the National Office for Aerospace Studies and Research) and its 
dyadic relations with the SMEs.  
In such a cooperative, interactive innovation process, we will argue that certain collaborative tools or 
practices emerge, aimed at reducing information asymmetries or acting as compensation mechanisms for 
other types of asymmetries between the partners at a microeconomic level; especially in France where 
there is a gap between the public R&D laboratories and the SMEs in terms of Technology Readiness 
Levels (TRLs). Some of these compensation mechanisms, particularly those related to the knowledge 
economy,could be adapted and reshaped for agents engaged in R&D and innovation in various other 
sectors, perhaps inducing positive amplification effects on innovation behavior, and thereby on economic 
growthat the macroeconomic level within the “national innovation system”. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The technology transfer process between a public laboratory and a company has been the subject 
of many publicationsand has been widely discussed in economic theory as well as in applied 
economics (e.g. in the Journal of Technology Transfer). Here we will deal with the specificities 
related to this process in France and, in particular, in the field of technology transfer arising from 
the field of aerospace and defense. 
These  specificities  relate  to  the  characteristics,  capabilities  and  competencies  („capacities‟) 
ofSMEs and public research laboratories. This paper will be based mainly on feedback regarding 
the strategy implemented for the development of an economically „healthy‟ relationship between 
ONERA  (Office  National  d’Etudes  et  Recherches  Aérospatiales,  the  National  Office  for 
Aerospace Studies and Research) and the SMEs surrounding it with mostly dyadic relations 
between themselves. The choice and definition of collaborative tools will be explained together 
with the analysis of the initial resultsand the prospects envisaged. 
We will contend that, in a cooperative process of innovation, these tools become mechanisms for 
reducing informational asymmetries (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1992) or “compensation mechanisms” 
(Paun, 2009) for other asymmetries between the variousplayers at a microeconomic level. These 
newly identified asymmetries, Institutional asymmetry (regarding the institutionalist theory of 
Veblen, 1914), Technological asymmetry and Risk asymmetry, often act as barriers to the 
technology transfer process, while simultaneously being critical for the eventual high intensity of 
the innovations pursued. The greater are the asymmetries, the stronger will be the impacts on the 
intensity of innovations, always supposing that the differently involved actors in the innovation 
process  do  succeed  in  working  together.  This  involves  the  effective  implementation  of 
asymmetries reduction (compensation mechanisms), through „blending‟ the capacities for change 
of the various agents.  
Some  of  these  mechanisms,  more  related  to  the  knowledge  economy,could  be  adapted  and 
reshaped  for  other  agents  in  the  R&D  and  innovation  domain,  and  for  evaluation  or 
regulationauthorities of this domain. Their implementation for these other players could induce 
an  amplification  effecton  innovation  and  its  direct  effects  on  economic  growthat  the 
macroeconomic level within the framework of the “national innovation system” (Freeman, 1987; 
Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). 
 
I. THEORETICAL ISSUES 
In appealing to a systems approach, in accounting for the points of conjuncture and disjuncture 
between small companies and large establishments, and between research labs and aerospace/ 
defense  companies/contractors,  we  are  thinking  of  both  the  vertical  elements  –  here  the 
progression from micro-level (of individual agents, like people and organizations) via the meso-
level (of individual sectors and/or regions) up to the macro-level (of national systems) and even 
global levels – and of the horizontal dimension, here the various types of asymmetry incurred by 
the various types of organization with which we are concerned, viewed both individually and 
collectively. 
 
I.1 Meaning of ‘capabilities’  
The line of argument we shall pursue is given by the recent popularity of the so-called „dynamic 
capabilities‟ school, as launched by David Teece and his colleagues in the 1990s (Teece et al., 
1997,  etc.).  Both  words  however  fall  into  a  category  described  by  the  eminent  Austrian 
economist from the middle of the 20th century, Fritz Machlup (1959), as „weasel-words‟, i.e. 
words that promised the hope of clarification but ended up just sowing more confusion, through 







































1  3 
Mindful of such problems, Teece et al. thus define dynamic capabilities in terms of 3 P‟s, namely 
position and paths, which define the dynamics, together with „processes‟, which we can interpret 
as „business processes‟, i.e. what we will term the „functions of the firm‟, and this brings them 
close to our own final definition as provided below. These authors do not distinguish between 
capabilities and „competencies‟ in their descriptions of the meanings, which is precisely where 
our own study takes off from.  
Our approach, in  brief,  is  to  assess what  „capabilities‟ are through adapting Nobel  Laureate 
Amartya Sen‟s concept of „consumer capabilities‟,
1 according to which capabilities comprise the 
ability to consume the product effectively, together with the  circumstances constraining that 
consumption process (e.g. the financial and legal environment in our case, or the „entitlements‟ 
to income in Sen‟s situation of famines). „Ability‟ to consume involves both the competencies 
acquired  by  purchasing
2  skills from other sources and  capabilities  proper,  learnt  within  the 
organization.  „Capabilities‟  in  this  sense  represent  an  intermediate  transformational  concept 
between  orthodox  „characteristics‟  of  a  product,  or  technology,  etc.  (see  Gorman,  1956; 
Lancaster,  1966)  and  the  orthodox  set  of  „rewards‟  (or  motivations)  for  making  use  of  the 
characteristics  for  some  stated  purpose  (e.g.  utility  in  Sen‟s  case  of  consumer  capabilities). 
„Capabilities‟ are highly heterogeneous as between individuals or organizations, in terms of both 
their  differentiated  nature,  and  the  amounts  with  which  each  individual  or  organization  is 
endowed (or dynamically able to enhance them through learning). 
Table 1 clarifies the distinction drawn in our analysis between capabilities and „competencies‟, 
pointing out the need for both in order for a region or country (or individual firm or industry) to 
be able to claim its capacity with regard to full dynamic capabilities.
3 
Table 1: Competencies vs. Capabilities: Essential differences 
Essential:  Competencies  Capabilities 
1. Function  Enhancements to „resources‟  Enhancements to „services‟ 
2. Stocks  Human and R&D capital stocks  Knowledge stocks 
3. Chain position  Inputs related  Outputs related 
4. Product area  Specific, focused  General, adaptable 
5. Supply–demand   Supply driven  Demand and supply driven 
6. Stage  Potential  Realised 
7. Development  Acquired and/or hired  Accumulated within 
8. Learning  Learning by searching (STI)  Learning by doing (DUI) 
9. Dynamics  Externally available as needed  Internally deployable in real time 
 
The sum of competencies and capabilities then gives us a figure for „capacity‟, as in building 
capacity both external and internal resources need to be meshed together. Such a meshing or 
„blending‟ process is contrary to the difficult alternatives of blocking or bridging proposed by 
Putnam et al. (1993). We shall return to this point in discussing interactivity below. 
                                                 
1 Defined for very different purposes by Sen (e.g. for famines in poor countries; see Sen, 1985, etc.). 
2Even if there are no monetary charges for this acquisition process, there must be opportunity costs of the time etc. 
involved, as in Friedman‟s celebrated concept of there being “no such thing as a free lunch” – without even 
attempting to cost up the risks involved in changing one‟s skill base (see below).  
3 The list here is loosely based on that given by von Tunzelmann (2009) which also lists a further 8 „associated‟ 
differences, regarded as less definitive and more by way of elaboration. Key pointers to the definitional differences 







































1  4 
This three-tiered and nested approach is then extended by our research (e.g. von Tunzelmann & 
Wang, 2003, 2007; von Tunzelmann, 2009, etc.) to producer capabilities (involving production 
of all kinds and not necessarily standard manufacturing processes), drawing for this purpose on 
Edith  Penrose‟s  theory  of  the  „growth  of  the  firm‟  (Penrose,  1959)  and  also  to  „supplier 
capabilities‟,  where  issues  of  IPRs  may  become  paramount  because  of  possibilities  for 
appropriation by giant firms. Thus in Figure 1 there are 3 types of actors, which occupy the full 
area of prospective agents. From a supply chain or supply network perspective, all actions are 
ones of production or consumption or supply, and often all three at the same time. Thus in the 
process  of  producing  this  paper,  intended  for  the  consumption  of  various  types  of  readers 
including policy-makers as well as academics, there is therefore a „forward linkage‟ to users, in 
addition to „backward linkage‟ (in the sense of Hirschman, 1958) to our suppliers – on this 
occasion the accumulated wisdom of our forebears, plus the accumulation of technology in the 
form of instruments and artifacts, like computer hardware and software, This 3x3 matrix thus 
applies quite generally to any form of production, whether governmental (producing policies, 
etc.), or academics (producing research papers), or firms (producing products), however different 
the actual production processes are and also the conditions of governance. Most of these are in 
fact multi-agencies, whereby academics produce students and consultancy reports as well as 
„papers‟; governments produce physical and social infrastructure as well as policies; increasingly 
one finds manufacturing companies producing services alongside their traditional goods, etc. 
(Davies & Hobday, 2005). Note that we find it useful to distinguish between agents, as the 
physical embodiments of people or the organizations to which they belong, with either being 
represented by its name, and actors, representing the multiple roles that nearly all agents will 
have to play. Not surprisingly, perhaps, we have to relax this distinction in our discussion to 
follow, where we shall be taking ONERA as „the‟ technology supplier and the SMEs as „the‟ 
customers.  
Figure 1: The model of capabilities in the technology supply chain 
 
 
In the figure, the markets operate effectively, though they are limited to being the outcome of 
exercising capabilities and competencies. In the row of characteristics, there is first the matching 
of the supply of and demand for technology (NB a „derived demand‟,
4 depending on the next 
market along, which is the one given here in the final column as the match between the supply of 
and demand for products). There are mirror image mappings to those from the capability vector 
to that of characteristics, in the mappings from capabilities to motivations, or „rewards‟, again 
                                                 



























































1  5 
inserting a physical differentiation into a value-defined space (here „profitability‟ rather than 
prices though). Finally there are non-market exchanges which take place directly among the 
agent producers themselves, with the horizontal arrows typically representing asymmetries of 
knowledge between the agents and the respective capabilities. 
 
I.2 Dynamic and interactive capabilities 
The  first  „static‟  version  of  the  approach  as  discussed  so  far  via  Figure  1  can  then  be 
straightforwardly extended further to the context of interactive learning (Lundvall, 1992), and 
hence  to  „dynamic  capabilities‟  proper  (Teece  et  al.,  1997).  As  shown  in  the  diagram,  the 
interactive  elements  are  partly  mediated  through  market  mechanisms  relating  to  supply  and 
demand factors, in connection with both the characteristics (product possibilities, etc.) and the 
rewards (profitability etc.); however the most interesting form of interactive learning consists of 
direct interchanges of knowledge among the actors, shown by the two-headed horizontal arrows 
in  Figure  1.  Although  this  is  often  represented  as  „absorptive  capacity‟,  we  take  here  the 
opportunity for a more proactive role, of „giving as good as one is getting‟ through reciprocity in 
networks and partnerships. This might be termed the third face of R&D,
5 following the first face 
of original technological development and the second face of the ability to reproduce the 
technological results of others – this third face indicates what the company or other recipient 
agent can bring to the negotiating table in terms of the stage of knowledge acquisition. 
In these respects there is already a dynamic component to interactive capabilities, but strictly 
speaking dynamic capabilities in our sense of the term concern responses in real time to stimuli, 
such  as  would  be  emitted  by  market  competition  or  technological  change.  „Real  time‟  here 
signifies a period of time which extends for just long enough to capture some or all of the 
potential rewards from the innovation. The emphasis lies on speed – being in the first place ready 
Innovations, Cahiers d’économie de l’innovation, vol. 2008/2, no. 28, Economie de la Défense, 
Finance et Innovation, pp. 61-83. 
Stephan R.,  2006,  “Which  practices  for  universities  to  enhance  exchanges  and  transfer?”, 
presentation at the French American Foundation seminar “Research & Innovation: Best Practices 
for the Future”, University of Compiegne, Paris. 
to hand to match the new requirements, i.e. any suitable set of human and non-human resources, 
while the latter is more a question of adequate entrepreneurial flair. All of this accounts for our 
stress on speed and catching-up in real-time activities of the organization.   
Relationships posited can be thought of as linked dyads, with alternative time sequences (i.e. 
with  the  supplier-producer  links  and  producer-consumer  links  preceding  or  succeeding  each 
other in rather random fashion). The effectiveness of such links depends on the motivations 
(incentives of expected profitability etc.) but also the „capabilities‟ for operating the links, on 
both sides of each dyadic relationship.  
 
I.3 Dynamic scale and scope economies 
Such gains in speed come at a cost, as reflected in time–cost trade-offs (Scherer, 1967). To 
justify themselves they must cover these and any ancillary costs over the medium to longer run. 
We shall pursue them below in the guise of so-called „limit curves‟, by sector. These „dynamic‟ 
scale economies most often arise at a systemic level; e.g. the increasing prices of an „average‟ 
microprocessor  unit  („chip‟)  over  time  as  the  complexity  rises  is    more  than  offset  by  the 
downstream impacts of much faster speeds of working and much higher levels of integration, 
according to the operation of „Moore‟s Law‟.  
                                                 







































1  6 
Economists have become accustomed to talking about economies of scope as well as of more 
traditional scale, even though there is an inherent tension between the two concepts when applied 
in practice. Putting the argument another way, there would seem to be an inherent trade-off 
between  economies  of  scale  and  economies  of  scope.  While  vertical  integration  generally 
requires large plants in most manufacturing industries (e.g. integrated steel mills), horizontal 
integration, i.e. at  a specific product  or technological  level,  can often  be achieved by using 
smaller-scale production methods, in order to reap the synergies on offer from economies of 
scope at other levels, e.g. mini-mills in steel. It is worth emphasizing at this point that economies 
of scope, just like economies of scale, can arise in any of the functions of the firm or other 
organization under analysis, e.g. in marketing or in finance, and not necessarily in production or 
technology.  
Dynamic  scale  and  scope  economies  are  of  two  main  kinds,  One  is  the  long-term  secular 
improvement associated typically with infant industries and their protection, often as part of a 
catching-up strategy of development. The second way, which is of more concern to us here, is 
through short-term, real-time gains that reflect speeding-up behavior, e.g. in big business, where 
Chandler (1977) refers to increased throughput in production and increased stock turnover in 
distribution (marketing). Such gains, which despite arising in the short run tend to be quasi-
permanent and quasi-irreversible, are what we term „time-saving‟ (von Tunzelmann, 1995), and 
are as already indicated crucial (or so it is alleged) in the resort to networking by individual 
firms. They do so in order to leverage their own „home-grown‟ capabilities through acquiring 
competencies from other organizations.  
 
I.4 Dynamic appropriabilities 
Commensurate with such dynamic scale and scope economies at the production possibilities 
level there are dynamic appropriabilities to be reaped at the rewards level. In much the same 
manner, these potentially arise out of being quicker or more accomplished at seizing the market 
or technological opportunities going. Thus, as Reinert (1994) has stressed, developing countries 
have tended to place too many of their hopes on the perfection of markets for their export goods, 
without allowing sufficiently for the fact that it is turning imperfect markets to one‟s advantage 
that secures the highest private gains from trade. 
Our own position when it comes to looking into the economic dynamics of appropriabilities 
reflects our views of dynamic scale and/or scope economies, namely that they have to do with 
developing speedy responses to constantly changing circumstances, such as are associated with 
continual incremental technical change and product development. More specifically these may 
emerge in such respects as opening up lead times over rivals, changes in corporate or brand 
reputations, changing patterns of trade secrets, etc. And whereas traditional static forms of IPRs 
include  such  aspects  as  patents,  trademarks  and  copyright,  the  newer  „anti-IPR‟  elements 
incorporate such (ostensibly) radically different opinions as „open-source‟ software, „copyleft‟, 
etc.  
 
II. CONTEXT, POSITIONING AND ROLE OF THE ACTORS IN INNOVATION 
A brief description of ONERA‟s economic environmentis necessary for a better understanding of 
the reasons for the tools it uses and disseminates, and their operation, as well as being a reminder 
of the fundamental principles of innovationand the role of technology transfer therein. 
ONERA  is  a  scientific  and  technical  public  corporationwith  commercial  andindustrial 
characteristics (EPIC), created by Law no. 46-895 on May 3rd 1946 and modified by decreesno. 
63-385 and no. 84-30. Its mission is defined as follows: “... to develop and direct research in the 
aerospace field; to design, develop and implement the necessary technical tools and benches for 
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circulation, at a national and international level, of the results of this research; to support their 
utilization  by  the  aerospace  industry;  and  possibly  to  facilitate  their  application  outside  the 
aerospace field”. Thus its mission so far as interactive capabilities are concerned is to diffuse 
them as widely and rapidly as seems feasible.  
The quotation just given is important for understanding ONERA‟s position in the TRL
6 chain 
(Mankins, 1995), its role in technology transfer, and more generally its role in innovations 
generated on the basis of the technology that it has created. 
So the legal text gives a futurology mission toONERA “... to develop and direct...”, a mission as 
originator and ownerof experimental resources, to circulate the results and to be a discriminatory 
facilitator(for  the  national  and  European  industry)  for  the  creation  of  value  “...to  support 
utilization... ”  
This nuanceis very important, particularly in the „ideological opposition‟ between those who 
prioritize  a  „publication‟  strategy  and  those  who  prefer  one  that  stresses  a  „patent‟,because 
premature disclosure, in the form of articles or conferences, ensures the circulation of knowledge 
but  also  facilitates  uncontrolledutilizationof  the  results  of  research  by  industry,  including 
competitorsof the national or European industry. However we should recall from our analytical 
study already reported in section I.4 above that this gives a somewhat loaded view of IPRs, 
focusing on static results, to the possible detriment of longer-term dynamic gains. 
It must also be observed that ONERA has to transfer the results of its research(in order to “...  
support utilization...”) to the aerospace industry and also “... outside the aerospace field...” 
Its supervisory authority is the Head of the French national armaments organization (DGA). The 
other organizations with which ONERA has close relationshipsare the DGAC,CNES, the ESA
7 
and of course the European Commission (EC) through contracts that are part of the PCRD
8. Its 
strategic customer-partners are the large French or European aerospace groups,such asAirbus, 
Eurocopter, Astrium, Snecma, Thales and Dassault. During its entire existence ONERA has  
devoted most of its activities to studiesdirected by or for this first circle of institutional or 
industrial partners. 
The last consolidated figures show an annual operational budget of€187 m, of which 57% comes 
from R&D service contracts, and a labor force of2047 employees.  
 
II.1 - Specificities of the Aerospace and Defense field 
This brief description of ONERA‟s economic environment needs a complementary analysis of 
the players from the point of view of the utilization of its research results by industry. 
Hence Figure 2 presents a classification of the market sectors according to two parameters: the 
time involved in launching products resulting from a new technology in the market, and the 
complexity of the products intended for this market, roughly approximated by the cost of a unit 
of the product(Stephan, 2006).  
Stephan, in presenting this figure, proposed a generic limit to innovation process control (up to 
the successful delivery of the new good and/or service to the market) by the carrier-creator of the 
technology itself. The originally defined curve, of the kind already noted in our survey in Part I 
above, supposes that a new product requiring very low development costs or complexity could 
be introduced to  a market  if time were expandable. We consider that for a low complexity 
product with low development costs many actors could proceed to develop this type of new 
product. Its time for introduction to the market will depend mainly on its acceptability by the 
                                                 
6 Technology Readiness Levels 
7Respectively: General Directorate of Civil Aviation; National Center for Space Studies; European Space Agency 







































1  8 
consumers. As soon as they can accept the new product, everybody could provide it. Thus the 
time will be cut short instead of being expandable (or else the product will never be introduced 
because of never getting accepted). 
The original defined curve supposes also that a new product requiring unlimited development 
costs with exceptionally high complexity could be introduced in a market only if it could be 
delivered in a very short time („real-time‟). The development means are assumed to be limited 
















Figure 2:  Limits to innovationprocess control by the creator (or assimilator) of technology, 
by technological sector:     - R Stephan’s limit     - - Authors’ proposed limits 
 
Acknowledging this analysis with Stephan, we nevertheless contend that this generic limit curve 
has  to  be  transformed  in  an  elliptic  type  curve  from  an  initial  hyperbolic  type,  of  the  kind 
encountered  previously  in  discussing  time-cost  trade-offs  above.  The  basic  reason  for 
abandoning the hyperbolic shape is derived from considering the sectoral space here and thus the 
(approximate) sectoral contrasts.  
It also must be admitted that an SME has less material means to establish a successful new 
good/service in the market than a large group. This is even more evident for a start-up partner. 
Thus we also propose to divide the limit curve into three branches corresponding to these three 
types of agents. These new proposed limits are generically represented in Figure 2. 
The specificity of the aerospace and defense markets asserts itself very quickly because these 
sectors,which are generally „complex systems‟ (Davies & Hobday, 2005),require a lot of time for 
the development  and introduction of a new product  to  the market.  We note that even large 
groups,  beyond  a  certain  limit,need  institutional  support  at  the  national  level,  if  not  at  the 
international level, to develop new technologies. 
So in what circumstances would ONERA be able to respond wellto its futurology mission of 
“developing  and  directing  research”  and  its  transfermission  “to  support  the  utilization  of its 
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1  9 
By being located within the upper limit of the diagram, the large aerospace sector and French 
and  European  defensegroups  stand  out  as  designated  partners  for  successfully  „bearing‟,  i.e. 
acting as generator, carrier and user of (hence, all the „actor‟ roles for) the new technologies 
suggested and/or developed by ONERA. This is particularly the case for the incremental or 
specialized innovation of the large groups. Such „bearing‟ is however less obvious in the case of 
technological breakthroughs(see McCooe, quoted inGolob, 2006), and this is even more the case 
in the civil aerospace sector where technologies used on-board planesmust be safe and tested. 
For these aspects, since its creation ONERA has developed and maintained effective strategic 
partnerships with the large national groups which have mostly become multinationals in recent 
years. This partnership policy will not be the subject of our analysis here. 
The fundamental question raised during the development of ONERA‟s implementation strategy 
is that of access to markets, for breakthrough technologies resulting from a specialized research 
sectorsuch as aerospace. From this point of view, the preceding diagram, presenting the limits to 
innovationprocesses, illustrates the point that, to put a „breakthrough technology‟ on the market, 
thus challenging the existing products and/or business models, such as may be designed by a 
national skill centre, the best vectors are the SMEs. This provides the systemic element of the 
dynamic scale economies already referred to in Part I.  
Technological demonstrations that result in innovation will not necessarily take place in the 
aerospace market but can arise in any of the market sectors in which the SME receiving the 
technologycan itself control the innovationprocess completely(until the successful introduction 
of the new product to the market). Some niche markets will be accessible, even in the aerospace 
sector(green  aviation,  small-scale  drones,  leisure,  etc.).Once  the  technology  is  demonstrated, 
there are strong chances that the large aerospace groups will integrate this technology as a tested 
module into the systems they are designing(Mouchnino & Sautel, 2007). 
The strategic choice was taken at ONERA to develop a partnership relationshipwith a national 
and European SME. If no SME is identified, the launching of a start-up partner could be studied, 
subject to the economic outlook and adequate financial support. 
 
II.2 - ONERA-SME Relationships 
Like any healthy dyadic partnership, that between ONERA and an SME must be a winning one 
for both parties. Both partners must have strong positions(Cowan, Jonard & Zimmermann, 2003) 
with each adopting its own role so that their collaboration generates significant added value. So 
ONERA develops its best technological solutions, possibly breakthrough technologies, and the 
SME implements its product development, industrialization and marketingcapabilities in order to 
reinforce its competitive advantage in its markets or to create new ones. 
These complementary roles, based for one side on a „craftsman instinct‟ and for the other on a 
„predatory  instinct‟,opposable  in  the  sense  given  by  the  theory  ofVeblen  (1899),  generate 
significant asymmetries between the two partners.  
Figure 3 presents the existing asymmetries between the public R&D laboratories and the SMEs 
in France by showcasing their respecting positions with regard to the TRLs (Mankins, 1995);
9 it 
should be stressed for joint projects. It relies on simple and tested principles of « win - win » and 
« give - give », providing benefits for each participant, as summarized below:   
                                                 
9This figure was first presented and generally accepted at the „Rendez Vous Carnot‟, Lyon, France, 2010, in the last 
























































Figure 3: Asymmetries between public R&D laboratories and SMEs, by TRL score 
It should be emphasized that the majority of the public R&D laboratories in France carry out 
their activities at levels TRL 1 (basic research) and TRL 2 (applied research). The 33 Carnot 
Institutes, being responsible in [AI Carnot, 2008] for some €470 million of research carried on in 
partnership with industry, and representing about a half of the yearly budget for French research 
undertaken in partnership with industry, are generally well involved in applied research (TRL 2). 
Very few of the Carnot Institutes could carry their research up to laboratory demonstration levels 
(TRL 3-4). Exceptionally and limited to particular programs, some of the Carnot Institutes could 
bring their technology to operational levels (TRL 6-7). 
Beside these figures, the SMEs are currently running their business at TRL 9 (these are selling 
products, services or components). Fewer than 10% of French SMEs have Development Offices 
able to integrate (or absorb) operational prototypes (TRL 6-7), in order to structure production 
chains and introduce new products to the market. And even fewer have R&D capacities able to 
understand  technologies  available  at  Lab  Demonstration  Levels  (TRL  3-4).  Thus,  the 
technological asymmetry existing between public R&D labs and the SMEs becomes obvious. 
In  addition,  is  well  known  that  between  the  same  levels  an  equity  gap  is  evident  in  some 
European countries, hence the European Investment Fund (EIF) and several public-owned banks 
(like  CDC  in  France)  have  dedicated  important  financing  programs  to  compensate  for  this 
Europe-specific „amorçage‟ equity gap. This of itself will induce an important risk asymmetry 
between public R&D and the SMEs. 
These asymmetries must be reduced (for the informational asymmetries) or compensated for 
(technological  capacities,  financial  and  institutional  risks)  in  order  to  support  this  new  co-
development relationship between the parties, as put forward in this analysis. The collaborative 
tools  will  thus  be  reduction  and/or  compensation  mechanisms  for  the  existing  asymmetries 
between ONERA and its SME partners, with the aim of creating a trust environment between the 
two agents. 
I           I             I        I                     I       I                  I TRL
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1  11 
Owing to their small size (INSEE, 2008) but also to the structural weaknesses of the innovation 
support system set up by SMEs and/or start-up partners in France (Serfati, 2008; Levy & Jouyet, 
2007), French SMEs must have suitable support mechanisms (private or public) for the success 
of a possible common development program with ONERA, in order to absorb new technology 
and to make a success of their international commercial deployment.  
Two different approaches were targeted by ONERA‟s Technology Transfer Office (TTO). More 
than ¾ of the signed agreements were obtained through a Market-Pull approach and under ¼ 
were obtained from a Technology-Push approach. Figure 3 supports this part of our analysis. 
Indeed, following an intensive advertising campaign based on slogans like: “Come to see us if 
you have a Technology issue! We are the MacGivers of the Science and you will never be 
alone”, the majority of its SME partners did come to see ONERA addressing their technology 
issues. They had generally already identified a business-growing opportunity while calling on 
ONERA‟s TTO and they were looking for missing competencies in their company. We describe 
this as a Market-Pull approach. Technology-Push instead occurs when ONERA‟s TTO promotes 
a technology newly developed within ONERA and negotiates a license with an interested SME 
(or start-up). 









Figure 4: Risk curves related to the Technology Development Investment curve 
Based on our observations and royalties return, Market-Pull projects have until now been the 
more successful. Accordingly, we propose our analysis of these results. In Figure 4, the risk 
curve for a technology-push approach is given by the continuous stepped line, while the dotted 
line shows a case of the market-pull approach. We can observe that both exhibit a high level of 
risk while investing in operational technology demonstrations and above all in launching New 
Products (goods and services) into the market.  Nevertheless, we remain confident about our 
implicit assertion in Figure 3 that, throughout the cycle, the risk levels are lower in the Market-
Pull approach than with Technology-Push. 
This lower risk exposure is induced at each stage by the belief that the SME partner has already 
identified  a  market  and  already  possesses  a  structured  production  chain  (including  a  supply 
chain). These considerations act as drivers throughout the technology collaborative development 
process, raising the company‟s rating on the TRL scale, thus reducing its risks and costs. The 
Market-Pull approach also seems to accelerate this technology development process; thereby 
accentuating the dynamic capabilities that the firm is able to parade. 
We further adopted a hybrid strategy for ONERA while working with SMEs. Indeed even if the 
market-pull approach seems to be less risky and sooner beneficial, and even if it is producing 
incremental and often radical innovations by changing the domain for the adopted aerospace 
technology, we do believe that some technology-push activity will continue to be important for 
eventually  nurturing  disruptive  innovations  in  ONERA‟s  core  business  domain.  Another 


















































































































































































































































1  12 
higher degree of motivation provided to its scientists while promoting their newly developed 
technologies.  
This  hybrid  strategy  places  the  agents  of  the  innovation  system  in  a  cooperative  network 
generating newly created value through a process of technology transfer.  
 
II.3 - ONERA-SME partnership innovative strategy  
The ONERA-SME technology transfer process cannot be analyzed without taking account of the 
relationships of the two players with their own reference frames, in terms of evaluation and 
sectoral/territorial regulations, in the sense of Granovetter (1985). These are mechanisms that are 
external to the simple ONERA-SME relationship which must intervene and accompany this dual 
relationship  throughout  the  entire  collaborative  project,  and  some  of  the  collaborative  tools 
proposed take them into account.  
 
II.3.1 - Collaborative tools and their development 
Initially, an analysis of the role of each player during the innovation process is proposed and 
even, albeit in a more restrictive way, in the technology transfer phase.  As mentioned above, the 
activity of the public R&D laboratories in France involves, structurally, TRL levels lower than 
levels 3-4, corresponding to the laboratory prototype stage. Only a few basic ideas conceived by 
the researchers attain this level of technological maturity and even fewer cross levels 3-4 to go 
on to levels 6-7, corresponding to the demonstrator in operational conditions or a product. This is 
because the development of technological demonstrators is no longer part of the mission given to 
public research in France, a situation that is actually even worse for products.  
If, generically, during the TRL 1 level (basic research) and TRL 2 level (applied research), 1000 
original ideas finish up numbering 100 (via the personal filter of each researcher leading him or 
her to retain only one idea for every ten that he or she may have), are then cut down from 100 to 
10 (by discussions with his or her „close‟ circle of colleagues), and finally slimmed down from 
10  to  2  or  3  by  debates  with  the  line  management  and/or  decision  committees,  it  will  be 
interesting to see how these 2 or 3 results from various projects can cross level TRL 2 to arrive at 
levels 3-4 of prototyping. 
 
II.3.2 - Asymmetries in technology transfer relations and collaborative tools  
It can be seen that the research activities in TRL 1 and 2 are really mostly by the research 
laboratories because few SMEs are able to conduct their own research at these low TRL levels. 
Most innovating SMEs (apart from those that are really small labs in their own right) invest more  
in R&D activities after demonstrating technological feasibility, because their ultimate mission is 
to sell products successfully, with an economic logic of seeking profits. 
So, what can be done with a technology that reaches a research laboratory at level TRL 2? At 
this stage, a laboratory prototype can be shown to be feasible by simulation and/or the existence 
of certain elementary components with strong chances of success. Who must now invest in the 
development of this prototype and on which criteria should the decision be based? 
It seems obvious that at this stage the laboratory should consult the possible bearing vectors in 
the market: large groups and SMEs. If the technology developed corresponds to a strategic axis 
of development in a large group, quite naturally the latter will be interested in the appropriation 
of  this  technology  or,  at  least,  in  a  competitiveness  comparison  with  other  solutions.  The 
partnership process that would take place between the laboratory and this large group is not the 







































1  13 
The case that interests us is that in which an existing SME is interested in this technology, 
whatever its branch of industry. When no SME or large group expresses interest in the use of the 
new technology then there only remains the option of launching a start-up partner, in the case of 
a „disruptive‟ technology with high development risks and market potential, to be confirmed by 
market research; otherwise the development has to be abandoned. 
 
II.3.3 - Technological asymmetry and Risk asymmetry   
On the two assumptions, both for an SME and for a start-up partner, the problem of maturing 
technology up to the TRL 3-4 levels remains the same. It will be very difficult to get the SME or 
the start-up partner to finance this maturation. All this is related to the structural problem of 
financing developments in France but also to the lack of leading-edge scientific skills within the 
SME, allowing dialog with researchers and the appropriation of technology under the TRL 3-4. 
An  asymmetry  of  technological  capacity  is  revealed  here  and  an  asymmetry  of  the  risk 
(financial) between the two participants: the public research laboratory and the small company. 
Indeed, 95% of French SMEs are small companies with less than 50 employees (INSEE, 2008). 
The development and demonstration of a new technology based on emerging technology from 
aerospace  together  research  cost  at  least  around  one  million  euros  (according  to  our  own 
experience in  the relationships  with  our SME partners),  without counting the launching and 
development costs of the product line. However, most of the innovation assistance available in 
France is limited to 50% of the global amount (see Oseo, 2008, on refundable advances). This 
means  that  an  SME  that  undertakes  the  development  of  a  new  product  for  a  breakthrough 
innovation must assume half of the costs itself. For an SME with twenty people, €500K may 
well represent 25% of its annual wage bill.  
Here,  a  significant  risk  asymmetry  is  to  be  noted  between  the  SME  and  ONERA  because 
possible failure could mean a cessation of activities for the former. The same amount represents 
the  cost  of  four  ONERA  researchers  –  in  other  words,  of  its  far  higher  R&D  „capacity‟. 
Moreover, financial risk exists and is not negligible, especially in the EPIC culture, where we 
will see later that the scientists involved in the technology transfer relationship are very little 
aware of the risk for ONERA compared to the degree of the risk assumed by the SME. Other 
authors (e.g. Serfati, 2008) have also stressed the importance of social relationships (including 
cultural  relationships)  in  the  innovation  process.  This  difference  in  mentality  was  identified 
without any ambiguity in the collaborations undertaken by ONERA with various SMEs. 
A mechanism to try to solve this technological maturation and asymmetry problem has been 
developed  at  ONERA:  the  shared  risk  development  contract.  This  type  of  contract  was 
developed and signed, for the first time in France, between an EPIC and a business firm.  
For this phase of technology maturation ranging between TRL 2 and TRLs 3-4, the risk is still 
too great to be borne entirely by an SME as long as the technological proof, at least in the 
laboratory, as well as a complete comprehension of the technology, have not been achieved. It 
seemed  right  to  us  that  ONERA,  as  a  creator  of  technology,  should  be  able  to  join  future 
industrial and commercial owners in order to reduce the risks, and share the possible future 
benefits. The partnership is based on a technical and economic analysis of various phases of the 
development and on a Business Plan detailing the market prospects and investment returns on 
the new product. Based on this, ONERA can decide to assume part or all of the costs, within the 
framework of the co-development, the refunding of which, with profit-sharing based on business 
success, will take place or not, depending on the prospects for the use of the product.  
The negotiation of the percentage allocated to  sales, so  as  to  cover ONERA‟s  costs and its 
exposure to risk, is conducted according to criteria allowing the development of the company but 
also bearing in mind the fact that ONERA must make a positive return on all the operations of 
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contract is based are those of a service provided by ONERA on the basis of a determinable 
(though undetermined) price with payments deferred in time, negotiated between the parties on 
the basis of later sales and for a length of time agreed upon as part of the same negotiation.  
This type of contract proves to be a very good tool, both financially but also technically, for 
collaboration with co-design in mind, for the development of a new product, a logic equivalent to 
that described by Cowan (2003). This tool means two parties can together cross, within the 
meaning of Aoki‟s theory (Aoki, 2000), based on a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950), a possible 
financial and technological comprehension barrier that may otherwise induce blocking.  
In addition to compensating for risk and technological asymmetries between the two parties, this 
contract has also subsequently proved to be a good tool for reducing transactional information 
asymmetries  (Akerlof,  1970;  Stiglitz  &  Weiss,  1992)  between  the  start-up  partner  and  its 
investors. Indeed, at the time of the phase of „due diligence‟ between the creators of the start-up 
partners and the Business Angels, the shared risk development contract, signed with ONERA, 
yields paramount information on both the product and the target market, and on the technological 
developments and their costs. 
This last year, at ONERA, three contracts of this type were signed with various commercial 
companies  and  four  others  are  in  advanced  negotiations.  Two  of  these  companies  have 
succeeded in raising funds from investors. 
 
II.3.3.1 - Institutional asymmetry (mentality and behavior) 
The shared risk development contract is a collaborative tool that compensates for technological 
and risk asymmetries. Such a tool also compensates indirectly for a very important asymmetry in 
the  relation  between  the  transmitter  and  the  receiver  in  the  process  of  technology  transfer, 
institutional asymmetry, a term introduced here analogously with the terminology of institutional 
economy, within the meaning of “thought and action practices” by Veblen (1899) of “shared 
mental  models”  and  “belief  structures  that  intervene  as  formal  and  abstract  constraints  to 
structure human interactions” by North (1994). 
This  asymmetry  has  been  thoroughly  analyzed  because  it  can  sometimes  induce  a  more 
significant form of blocking in a dual relationship: cultural blocking. The word „institutional‟ 
must be understood as a sum of the rules, but also in its abstract aspect as a sum of beliefs, 
prejudices,  instincts  and  behaviors:  “Institutions  are  dominant  thought  and  action  practices” 
(Veblen, 1899). All these elements are generated historically, according to the way in which the 
actions are carried out and are assessed, but more especially through received education.  
Historically, applied research in France is really quite concentrated in national research centers 
specialized in a particular field (IFP, CEA, ONERA, Inrets, Inra, Inria, etc.). The universities 
have generally not been perceived as possible players in applied R&D. The proof is that before 
the Allegre Law in 1999, very few universities in France had a research result utilization service, 
and even these, before the Pecresse Law in 2007, did not have that complete autonomy which 
would allow them, among other things, to have a close relationship with the economic world.  
The  Summary  report  of  assessment  of  the  universities  of  the  wave  B  (AERES)  made  an 
observation which alludes to this: “... Socio-economic milieus.... their influence on the policies 
and  strategies  of  the  establishments  are  generally  weak,  because  of  their  lower  level  of 
involvement in the councils of the establishments”. 
The  utilization  activity  developed  since  the  Allegre  law  seems  itself  to  be  directed  toward 
research  contractualization  and  expertise-based  services,  but  hardly  at  all  in  the  field  of 
technology transfer. The following can be read in the same report: “Utilization - this is a declared 
objective  in  all  establishment  strategies.  Management  structures  (service,  SAIC,  subsidiary 
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performance.  On the other hand, the management  of patents  and licenses  and,  generally, of 
intellectual property, financially costly and requiring specialized skills, is accessible to these 
establishments  with  great  difficulty.  A  really  effective  utilization  policy  would  require  the 
creation of consortia within a regional or even national framework to reach the critical size 
necessary for effectiveness.”  
Leaving, in passing, to the reader the appreciation of the desirable ways of improvement, as they 
are  recommended  in  this  quotation,  we  should  mention  that  nowhere  in  this  report  is  a 
mechanism suggested for listening to the needs for development being expressed by the markets.  
In the Guide of the expert - Wave C of May 2008 of the same Agency (AERES) we can find 
positive developments going in the direction, in terms of the evaluation criteria, of taking into 
account activities around the utilization of research within the organizations being assessed. 
It is explicitly requested that the number of patents, the number of declarations of inventions, the 
cost of the patents, as well as the revenue generated by these, all be taken into account but, above 
all, the number of licenses. However, other fundamental indicators are lacking for a complete 
measurement of utilization activity, such as the revenue from possible capital shares held in the 
companies profiting from technology transfer, the evolution of the value of these companies, or 
the number of jobs created on the basis of these technologies.  
This, coupled with consideration of a criterion on the patentable technology detection activity 
within the establishment, but not of one on the capacity of listening to the market needs, or the 
capacity to carry out market research, will generate a culture of technology push instead of a 
market  driven  culture,  generally  recognized  (among  discussions  at  T2S  or  AUTM  Annual 
Meetings) as a better generator of innovation. 
Thus, the economic culture of the researchers is built throughout their career by indicators on the 
basis of which they are assessed, the most important indicator being recognition by peers, gained 
mainly  through  publications  by  the  researcher  according  to  panel  reviews.  However,  while 
publication circulates research results efficiently, without an adequate preliminary control it is 
contrary to the utilization mission of national industry and likely to reveal unprotected know-
how. 
In this same guide, the number of A and A+ type publishers is an important criterion in assessing 
establishments. The identification criteria of these authors include international patent deposits 
but do not stress those that were granted a license. Also, protection of the results is confused with 
their utilization and as a result it is likely that a great number of patents of no importance may be 
obtained because they do not contain any criterion bearing on their economic impact. It would 
undoubtedly be necessary to optimize the respective weights of a license, the incomes obtained 
with the latter, the patent and the publication.  
There  is  a  legitimate  question  to  be  asked  here:  when  does  a  license  generating  significant 
income have the same weight as (or even a greater weight than) an article published in Nature?  
There is indeed no antagonism between a patent and the publication of results from their source, 
only a priority on the submitting of the patent is to be respected. If a license counted for three 
traditional patents or nine publications … could this induce a change of mentality within the 
public research community?  
Moreover,  this  mentality  is  the  subject  of  an  unambiguous  analysis  in  this  same  report 
concerning  the  governorship  of  research  establishments:  “in  multiple-field  establishments, 
faculty-centered  organization  remains  very  vigorous.  In  certain  recent  universities,  it  is  an 
acknowledged will. The evolution of mentalities and practices is thus very slow…” 
The recent “Carnot Label” awarded to research establishments with partner research activities 
with industry (Carnot Law) has made it possible to evaluate the co-operation between industry 
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French public R&D manpower, generate nearly 50% of the research contracts with industry, for 
a total budget of €450 M, representing merely 1/3 of their annual consolidated budget. The share 
of this budget with the SME is however insignificant. 
So could a researcher become convinced that the utilization of research results is a noble aspect 
of his or her activity? This mentality, based rather on the “craftsman instinct” within the meaning 
of Veblen (1914), induces a strong asymmetry in the relationship between a researcher and an 
SME director, who will rather act according to a “predator instinct” from the “cultural” point of 
view, during their interaction for a technology transfer. This asymmetry may be strong at the 
beginning of the relationship, and can be compensated for gradually if a favorable environment 
is created to help the relationship to evolve from a transactional framework towards that of co-
operation. 
Now  that  this  institutional  asymmetry  concept  has  been  introduced,  we  can  see  that  the 
technological capacity asymmetry triggers collaboration between both participants and that the 
compensation  of  information  and  institutional  asymmetries  is  the  facilitator  because,  at  the 
beginning of their relationship, both parties face problems arising at the same time from the lack 
of technical information but also from the capacity to implement these once they are available 
(for example, it is not enough to read a patent to be able to manufacture a new product). 
The shared risk development contract is one of the mechanisms allowing the compensation of 
institutional,  technological  and  financial  risk  asymmetries,  during  the  the  integration  of 
researchers into the SME, when a technology transfer towards the SME takes place. 
This evolution results from acknowledging the failure of the existing spin-off policies of the 
public research establishments, whether in France or elsewhere in Europe. The great scarcity of 
researcher spin-offs is a logical consequence of the natural differences in skills necessary as 
between the enterprise world and that of research. Success in the creation of a company depends 
not only on the quality of technology, but particularly on that of the management team, and on 
financial  and  operational  resources,  in  order  to  control  marketing,  commercial,  financial, 
industrial and productive components, making it possible to move, in a limited period of time, 
from  a  good  technology  to  a  business  success.  The  goal  of  the  Charter  revision,  toward 
integration of the researcher wishing to “spin-off” into an existing structure, is thus to support 
the meeting, within a pre-existent framework: that of the SMEs, of these components of success 
so as to reduce the risks, for both the researcher and the SME, and for ONERA as well.  
The  departure  of  the  researcher  to  the  SME  wishing  to  accommodate  him  or  her,  with  the 
transfer of a technology in which he or she is an expert, takes place under conditions that are at 
the same time safe and incentivizing; in particular, the traditional conditions: the possibility of 
returning to ONERA during the first three years, financial aid, and the financing of training to 
reinforce the necessary skills for his or her new mission. 
The main point is however the condition of opening the SME capital to the researcher in order to 
position him or her as an “entrepreneur” on the same level as his or her new partners (at least 5% 
for  a  small  company;  flexible  for  an  average-sized  company).  This  makes  development  of 
“cultural” positioning possible for the spin-off researcher, and a clear confirmation of the interest 
of the receiving SME for the new business that the researcher will contribute to develop and 
manage within it. 
 
II.3.3.2 - ONERA–SME Technology Charter  
In order to give a more general framework for these relations, to gather the collaborative tools, to 
define the principles of the expected collaboration with the SME, and to ensure this collaboration 
policy can be maintained for the foreseeable future, ONERA made the strategic choice of setting 
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This Charter itself had to go beyond the simple problems of technology transfer and explore all 
the collaboration possibilities between ONERA and the small business world. It represents a 
moral engagement of the two parties, based on the principles and methods of collaboration and 
the values governing them. It also means the two parties wishing to collaborate can be on active 
watch, reciprocally validating their collaboration potential, and be able to start a collaborative 
project at the earliest opportunity. 
This  Charter is  fully positioned as  an institutional  collaborative tool,  within the meaning of 
Aoki‟s theory (Aoki, 2000). The two participants do more than give themselves the means by 
which to develop together because they are both on active technological watch in their respective 
markets, identifying opportunities for joint projects. 
It relies on simple and tested principles of „win–win‟ and „give–give‟, providing benefits for 
each participant, as summarized below: 
i) Mutual benefits 
a) Technological
10 benefits and opportunities for an SME 
Such partnerships make it possible for the SME to have access to R&D contracts in partnership 
with ONERA, to scientific expertise across the entire civil and defense aerospace field, and to 
technology  by  means  of  licenses,  simulations,  calculations,  testing  tools,simulation  tools  or 
software runs
11 and technological watches. 
These can reinforce its competitive advantages from accumulating competencies  out of the 
framework of R&D contracts, by proposing solutions that involve a stronger scientific added 
valuethanks to the contribution of ONERA, both from becoming first phases of technology 
transfer. To allow later developments, up to the marketing of pro ducts, ONERA has adapted its 
Spin-off Charter, as another collaboration tool, in order to support  
integrated into experimental projectsand technological demonstrations, and by allowing more 
competitive serviceswith a better adjusted division of the types of servicesprovided by ONERA 
and the SME. 
They permit giving access to marketsand customers that would be difficult for anSME to reach 
alone, since the latter will now have the benefit of the “ONERA Partner” label to present to large 
institutional and industrial accounts, thereby dodging some of the weaknesses of being small 
through taking part in the cooperation project. 
The  SME  can  also  profit  from  the  outcome  of  developments  in  contracts  with  ONERAfor 
progressing towards commercial use ofnew products in its markets. 
b) Benefits and opportunities for ONERA 
This partnership reinforces the competitive advantages of ONERAwithin the framework of R&D 
contracts, achieving this in various ways: 
-  by offering more cost-competitive services with a superior division of the types 
of service jointly providedby ONERA and the SME; 
-  by proposing more flexible and more directly operational solutions; 
-  by allowing greater reactivity, particularly in „original‟ and „changing‟ requests, 
within the framework of prototypesand experimental projects; 
-   by better controlling the costs and times of the production tasks necessary for 
the projects. 
The partnership offers access to customers/end-usersnot directly accessible by ONERA,supports 
mutual enrichment and emulationbetween the teams of ONERA and the SME, allows ONERA to 
                                                 
10For SMEs that involve themselves in the development of technologies in addition to their use. 
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be proactive and play a driving rolein the industrial field,and offers more dynamic potential 
outletsfor utilizing the research results, particularly for its technology transfers. 
ii) Types of partnership 
Several partnership modes can be implemented to carry out this project, such as partnerships in 
R&D contracts, the expertise and use of ONERA methods, shared risk development contracts, 
technology  transfer/utilization  of  ONERA  know-how;  this  goes  as  far  as  the  detachment  of 
researchersand/or their spin-off into the SME. 
iii) Profile of targeted SMEs  
The desirable profile fortargeted SMEs must allow fast self-identificationby the SME of its own 
capacity to enter into a partnership framework with ONERA by: 
-  having a production activity or technology service; 
-  working in a field that can benefit from the outcomeof ONERA‟s research; 
-  devoting – or having an objective to devote – at least 8% of its Turnover to 
R&D activities (this minimum can be modulated according to the size of the 
company) 
-  having financial viability; 
-  satisfying the SME criteria of the European Union; 
-  adhering to the values of the ONERA-SME Charter. 
iv) The “values” 
This  Charter is  primarily  a moral  engagement  between the parties, resting in  particular ona 
common vision of the business rules of the partnership: 
-  innovation  based  on  scientific  and  technical  excellence:  scientific  and  technical 
excellence  is  one  of  the  basic  elements  identified  by  the  SME  for  the  development  of  its 
innovating productsand  services.  This  excellence is  based on an internal  R&D policy at  the 
SME, as well as on external contributions, including among others those of ONERA; 
- a quest for performance: the concretization and perpetuation of success are guaranteed 
by a permanent search by the SME for improved economic performance, within the framework 
of the development and marketing of its goods and services; 
- constructive competition and fair-play: in the event of competition betweenSMEs on 
contractual or utilization activities, this will only proceed on the basis of technical and economic 
criteria, seeking performance and in a spirit offair-play between them, respecting the customer 
and/or ONERA. In particular, it would be a case of forbidding higher technical or economic 
bidslikely  to  lead  to  an  unidentified  risk  for  the  customerand/or  ONERA.In  the  event  of 
competition  with  ONERA,  the  rules  of  free  competition  apply;  a  reciprocal  tendering 
procedurecould be considered to assess a possible cooperative venture; 
- independence: eachSME preserves its independence; the network may be mobilized in 
defense of shared interests,but – barring exceptions – cannot be used to support private interests; 
-  commercial  ethics:  the  operation  of  the  project  shall  be  according  to  recognized 
commercial rules of ethics, in particular to exclude any private interestsituation between ONERA 
and SME researchers that may generate specific conflicts. 
 
III. RESULTS 
To date, 87 SMEs have signed theONERA-SME Charter and more than 40 licensing agreements, 
know-how communication agreements orshared riskdevelopment contracts are currently running, 
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years, corresponding to  the new development policy, while the remainder (12) represent the 
historical „heritage‟ of the old ONERA development policy.  
Table 2: ONERA–linked SME partners (selection only) 
Partner  Application  Type of collaboration 
Leosphere  Wind lidar    License, common R&D and 
spin-off contract  
Oktal-SE  Electromagnetic environment 
simulation   
Software licenses 
andcommon R&D contracts. 
Phasics  Laser interferometer  License and ONERA post-
graduate student recruiting  
Protip  Biomedical prosthesis containing 
porous Titanium 
License and shared 
riskdevelopment contract 
Ixsea  Inertial navigation  License 
Sirehna  Drones and gliders  Common R&D contract and 
software license in fluids 
Satimo  Medical imagery  Common development 
contract and license 
Isitek  Medical supervision in residence  License on sensors 
Microcertec  US machining of ceramics  License 
Fogale-nanotech  Capacitive sensors  License 
Andheo  Fluid mechanics and energetic  Software license and 
common R&D contracts 
Sofratest  Flow measuring  License 
C3EM  Fissure monitor and experimental data 
acquisition station in wind tunnels 
License, common R&D 
contracts 
Secapem  Real-time shot acquisition and 
validation system  
R & D contract and software 
license considered 
Mapaero  Pressure-sensitive paint  Know-how communication 
agreement  
Michalex  Micro-indentation at very high 
temperatures 
License andshared risk 
development contract  
ACV Aeroservice  Quiet green aircraft  R & D contract and shared 
riskdevelopment contract 
envisaged 
Nheolis  New type of wind power station  Shared riskdevelopment 
contract 
Keopsys  Laser  License 
 
Following the successful implementation of the new collaborative tools during this period, the 
number of collaboration agreements signed went from one to more than ten agreements per year. 
The number of spin-offs went from one spin-off every five years to one spin-off on average per 
year.Fifteen new proposals for common R&D contracts also came to light during this last period.  
Table 2 provides a selection of the partnerships withSMEs, this selection having been made on 
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A first experience feedback is nowavailable with the results of an investigation conducted with 
the SME partners.A questionnaire concerning the ONERA-SME collaboration was addressed to 
them, and 42 of the 68 SME partners,at that time, answered it.Of these42 SMEs, more than 80% 
have become partners of ONERA over the last four years. 
This questionnaire thus made it possible to confirm the first concrete results, in particular the 
creation of 170 jobs, at these 42 SMEs that answered the questionnaire, since the beginning of 
their relationship with ONERA. Among these, 104 jobs can be ascribed directly to the new 
activities developed bySMEs based on ONERA technology. The funds raised by the partner 
SMEs amount, to date, to more than €20 million.  
One  of  the  particularly  importantquestions  with  regard  to  the  confirmation  of  the  role  of 
collaborative  toolsin  the  reduction  of  information  asymmetry  between  theSME  and  other 
economic participants was: “To what extent has your relationship with ONERA influenced your 
development?”  It  revealed  that  half  of  those  who  answered  confirmed  having  an  image  or 
credibility  benefit  thanks  to  the  partnership.  Such  reputational  effects  represent  a  case  of 
dynamic appropriability that seems well worth pursuing in the near future. 
With regard to the development of the relationship with ONERA, half of those who answered 
would like to reinforce their direct relationship with ONERAresearchers (either in the form of 
direct expertise, or within the framework of a spin-off of the researcher into their team). Half of 
those who answered also wish to be better informed about developments in hand and the strategy 
of ONERA. The two indicators reveal a need to compensate the technological asymmetries and 
reduce the informationasymmetries that still exist between the SMEs and ONERA. 
The answers to this questionnaire and the knowledge of the operating rules of ONERA have led 
to proposals for new mechanisms, mostly within ONERA, which could compensate for a number 
of the asymmetries between the SMEs and the Office even more. Thus, a need for the following 
aspects was identified: 
-  the  development  of  a  specific  strategy  whereby  severalSME  partners,  together 
withONERA, develop technological demonstrators of the „systemic‟ type;the consortium 
thus  constituted  no  longer  adopting  a  management  characteristic  of  a  sequential 
innovation process but horizontal management (Rothwell, 1992) more suited to multiple-
field and multifunctional teams; 
- the development of anSME partner skill catalogue, to be distributed within ONERAto 
the research teams; 
- the periodic organization of joint events between ONERA and the SME, to which other 
participants such as customers would be invited, and the various innovation assistance 
structures; 
- the creation of a network of experts,with adequate training, to provide a single interface 
with the SME; 
- the possibility of conducting market research; 
  - the development of joint ONERA–SME laboratoriesfor maturing technologies. 
 
III.2 - The common technological maturinglaboratory as a collaboration tool  
In addition to other collaborative tools, it seems appropriate, in the case of complex projects 
requiring a technological maturation betweenTRL 2 and TRLs 3-4, for it to be possible for this to 
take place in the public laboratory‟s own maturationlab, a joint arrangement for which future 
technological developments are managed cooperatively with the SME partners. This laboratory 
would accommodate mixed teamscomposed of SME (or start-up) employees and researchers. 
The personnel costs would have to be borne by each party for its own staff. Mechanisms external 
to the SME–ONERArelationship, making it possible to ensure up to 80% of the wages of a 







































1  21 
The question of the financing of this Common Technological Maturation laboratory could also 
be resolved by making use of the additional Carnot contributions(under the Carnot Law) that the 
Institutes that are members of the Carnot Institute Association receive, to boost their scientific 
and technological resourceswithin the framework of their partnership policy. This is because one 
of the goals of the Carnot label,amongst others, is to support technology transfers. It remains a 
fact that no technological maturationshould be undertaken without preliminary market research, 
with product/market cross-referencing as obligatory. 
The Common Technological Maturation laboratory would also function as a new collaborative 
tool, facilitating the compensation and reduction of technological asymmetries(in its institutional 
aspect and in terms of the lack of information) between the two participants in thetechnology 
transfer but also as compensation for the risk asymmetry. 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has attempted to blend the theoretical demands imposed by approaches such as those 
relating to  innovation  studies (the  viewpoint of dynamic  and interactive capabilities), or the 
economics of information (highlighting asymmetries) especially as SMEs prevail on the side of 
customers for the technological competencies supplied in such circumstances. The first results 
show a series of development successes for innovativeproducts based on technologies created by 
ONERA, and this in a great variety of sectors viewed at the meso level, going from biomedical 
prostheses to the wind power market. 
The study, as far as it goes casts some light on the old and still largely unresolved question of 
how largely tacit knowledge – locked away inside a large and probably discreet organization, 
and representing its penrosian slack (Penrose, 1959; Brusoni et al., 2001) or „excess knowledge 
capacity‟ - can recirculate around its coterie of knowledge-hungry SMEs. Moreover it can do so 
effectively  enough  to  become  not  just  their  new  competencies  but  their  new 
capabilities.Basically,  to  do  so  involves  close  relationships  to  weaken  all  the  forms  of 
asymmetry, built around constant interchange of personnel as well as ideas and information, etc.  
This research also contributes to Stiglitz‟s “information asymmetry theory” by acknowledging 
the need to reduce and/or compensate for different asymmetries while carrying on a cooperative 
process like technology transfer which has impacts on all levels: direct impact on the agents 
(micro), on the regulators (regions and sectors – meso), and on economic growth (macro). 
 
IV.1 – The impact at the micro level 
As  for  any  form  of  transaction,  in  a  technology  transfer  process,  the  parties  involved  are 
informationally  asymmetric. The new SME policy  at  ONERA has  in  addition  given serious 
consideration  to  other  forms  of  asymmetries  characterizing  the  technology  transfer  and 
partnership  research  between  a  public  research  organization  and  an  SME  in  France: 
technological capacity asymmetries,institutional asymmetries and those of financial risk. 
The  collaborative  tools  deployed  at  ONERA  within  the  frameworkof  its  new  development 
policy, the shared risk development contract, the ONERA-SME Charter and the Spin-offCharter 
are  mechanisms  designed  and  implemented  to  ensure  the  reduction  of  the 
informationasymmetries  and  compensation  for  other  asymmetries  between  ONERA  and  its 
partners.  The  Common  Technological  MaturationLaboratory  is  another  proposal  for  a 
collaborative tool similar to those already in place. 
The relationship established between ONERA and an SME is perceived more as a cooperative 
relationship for a co-development rather than as a simple studyservice (i.e. just transactional). 
This relationship imposescompensation for financial risk and technological capacityasymmetries 
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between the two parties. Attention is thus drawn to the importance of the “issues of confidence 
and  interest”(Cowan  et  al.,  2003)  in  a  technology  transfer  relationshipwith  regard  to  the 
questions  of  opportunity  and  uncertainties  in  a  product/service  salesrelationship  (in  theFord 
sense). Each partner must, to some extent, learn and understand the culture of the other, without 
losing its own, in order to understand better and more generally to do what is necessary in order 
to balance the various asymmetries. 
Moreover,  the  ONERA–SMECharter  and  the  shared  risk  development  contracts
12  have also 
proven to be very effective tools in the reduction of information asymmetries between theSME 
(or the start-up partners) and other socio-economic players (investors, competitiveness centers, 
etc.). 
At ONERA, the cultural change taking place amongst the researchers involved in a relationship 
with anSME can be observed. Their contractual liability is reinforced by a better awareness of 
what is at stake, which the successful transfer of their know-how to theSME represents. They 
adopt  the  “predatory  instinct”(Veblen,  1914)  of  an  entrepreneur,  interested  intransfer 
opportunities for their technology outside the aerospace field. The implemented tools operate as 
relational facilitators in the relationship betweenONERAand the SME but also in the internal 
relationship within ONERAbetween the scientists and the supportstructures for utilization.  
The success of the operation ofcollaborative tools changes the internal operationrules specific to 
ONERA and allows proposing new internal mechanisms,such as the creation of a network of 
experts as a single ONERA interfacewith the SMEs, and the future possibility of carrying out 
market  research.The  purpose  of  these  mechanisms  will  be  to  increase  still  further  the 
effectiveness of the partnering relationship with the SME. 
 
IV.2 - Impacts at the meso-economic level 
The  first  successes  with  the  signing  of  the  ONERA–SMECharter  by  more  than  70  SMEs 
recognize and prove the significant role that ONERA can play as a source of innovations and 
also as a catalystfor a cluster of skills and multi-sector innovations. This is valid for all the 
regions where ONERA is represented, thus confirming the views of other authors (Etzkowitz, 
1999; Florida & Cohen, 1999). 
ONERA‟s change of strategy in the choice of its customers, because of its opening to the world 
of the SME, has had an effect on the diffusion of its technologiesbeyond the aerospace field and 
especially  on  its  positioning  in  other  marketsectors  as  well  as  in  its  relationship  with  its 
customers. Having a study service relationship with a large industrial group, ONERA has now 
also given itself the opportunity of having a co-development relationship with the SME partners. 
The intervention of ONERA in multi-sector innovations,on the basis of its research results in the 
aerospace field, puts the Office in competition with other traditional suppliers ofresearch, in each 
of their specific fields.  This has an impact on the „forms of competition‟ (costs, quality, speed of 
development)  and  ONERA  could  thus  find  itself  in  an  advantageous  positiondue  to  its 
multidisciplinary skills. 
The  new  form  of  “multi-sector  innovation”  competition,  inducedby  the  new  ONERA-SME 
policy, could prove to be important from the point of view of access to public funds. Thus 
                                                 
12 The shared risk development contract has been developed by the ONERA DCV team during the last 5 years. The 
authors of this article who took part in developing this tool wish especially to thank Corinne Le Hong for her 
contribution in updating the Risk Sharing Co-Development contract and to Frédéric Lamy for his contribution in 
updating the same contract, but also to the entire team (led by Mihel Lambert) who are nowadays continuing to 








































1  23 
ONERA,  in  partnership  with  a  suitable  cluster  of  SME  partners,  is  able  to  bid  for  public 
programs to build technological demonstrators. In some of these programs, this could generate 
fair-play competition with its own strategic partnersamong the large aerospace industry groups. 
ONERA‟s new policy of development with SMEsoffers a solution to the problemencountered in 
a general way by clusters of companies, of the competitiveness center type, which are based on 
the effects of agglomerationand of specialization(Weber, 1909/1929). This cluster model has 
proved risky for long-term developmentdue to exaggerated territorial specializationand the lack 
of job diversification, skills and sectors in the region, which could thus become a disadvantaged 
“small world” (Watts & Strogarz, 1998). 
The positive effects of this new policy at the territorial level have been confirmed for the effects 
of complementarity and the interactions thus generatedbetween various SMEs (Zimmermann, 
2002), encouraging them to work in complementary sectors, not necessarily belonging to the 
regional competitiveness centers; this has been in order to develop innovative solutionsin their 
sectors  based  on  the  high  technology  licensed  by  ONERA,  a  form  of  technology  originally 
developed for the aerospace sector but potentially adaptable to the needs of low and medium-
tech sectors (von Tunzelmann & Acha, 2005). . 
One of the results of the practical application of the new ONERA–SME policyis that ONERA 
became  a  “distant  source”(Maskell  et  al.,  2005)  of  new  ideas  and  expertise  for  other 
competitiveness centers outside the aerospace field. Thus, ONERA‟s SME partners and members 
of these so-called competitiveness centers no longer depend only on internal interactionsspecific 
to the center that they are members of in order to have access to R&D resources, but also benefit 
in their innovation work from skills that are external, in the geographical and sector sense.This 
reasoning has proved to be valid also for the case of geographically isolated SMEs that encounter 
difficulties in becoming members of the centers of another area, the partnership with ONERA 
allowing them an important access to R&D skills. 
As a transition to the macro-economic level, an important perspective could directly impact the 
development  policies  of  regionally  specialized  clusters,  as  with  the  national  strategies  for 
innovation. The R&D laboratories will adapt their behavior by intensively using asymmetries 
compensation/reduction mechanisms in their relationship with the regionally specialized SMEs 
but  also  with  other  SMEs,  not  regional  or  acting  in  other  domains.  Thus,  the  regionally 
specialized  clusters  (supposing  there  is  more  than  one  present  in  the  same  region)  will  be 
interconnected through direct collaborations occurring between some of their “provider (R&D 
labs)”  and  technology  “consumer  (technology  adopter  SMEs)”  members.  They  will  also  be 
interconnected  with  other  non-regional  clusters.  These  types  of  interactions,  driven  through 
either Market-Pull or Technology-Push (or Hybrid) approaches, will exchange technology inside 
and outside their related clusters, with no more monitoring by Clusters Authorities. To upgrade 
this type of possible multiple embedded innovative system, mainly based on technology transfer 
between providers and consumers of technology, we consider that smart grids models could be 
an appropriate approach (Paun, 2010). 
 
IV.3 - Impact at the macro-economic level 
The relationships that the SME partners have developed with ONERA allow changes towards 
sector-based  operating  rules  specific  to  the  innovation  assistance  structures  or  to  regional 
development,  in  relation  to  professional  networks,  in  the  sense  of  “cumulative  causality” 
(Veblen, 1914) or of “recursive causality” (Morin, 1990). Thus, it has been observed that some 
of  ONERA‟s  SME  partners,  especially  the  decisional  committees  of  this  type  of  structure 
(competitiveness centers, trade associations), proselytize for this new type oftool to collaborate 
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Other  national  structures  grouping  various  innovation  players  actively  examine  some  of  the 
collaborative tools developed within the framework of the new SME policy of ONERA. These 
tools are often the subject of analysesby think tanks made up of these national structures,in order 
to exchange ideas regarding good practicesbetween their respective members. 
The  adoption  and/or  generalization,  after  the  inherent  adaptationsdue  to  the  sector-based 
specificities  of  the  various  parts,  of  these  collaborative  tools  by  these  other  structures  or 
networks  could  induce  the  same  positive  results  as  those  obtained  by  ONERAand  its  SME 
partners, on innovation at a national scale. 
Many  authors  have  identified,  in  the  various  studies  of  the  conditions  and  mechanisms  of 
financial  support  for  innovationand  their  impact  on  economic  growth,  that  information 
asymmetry (Akerlof, 1970; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1992) is one of the major factorsinfluencing the 
financial risk taken to generate innovations. 
The ONERA–SME collaborative tools have shown how their role can lie in the reduction of this 
asymmetrybetween these SME (and start-up) partners and their respective investors. Indeed, the 
fund-raising required for the development of projects by the SMEs became  much easier.The 
generalization of this type of tool will no doubt mean the constitution of a better Business Angels 
cultureand Venture Capital in France and, especially, the appearance of new investors due to the 
reduction in financial risk as a result of the reduction of information asymmetrybetween the 
SMEs (or start-up partners) and investors. As an example, the shared risk development contract, 
signed by start-up partners with ONERA, proved thereafter to be a facilitatordocument in the 
phase ofdue diligence between the start-up partner and its Business Angels. 
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